One (Un)Like the Other: Rethinking Ethics, Empathy, and Transcendence from Husserl to Derrida

According to Husserl's phenomenological approach, empathy plays a foundational role in the constitution of intersubjectivity and the construction of a shared objective world. Husserl posits that empathy allows the individual ego to apprehend the alter ego as an embodied spiritual being, thereby establishing intersubjectivity. This process involves the analogical transfer of experiences, where the self projects into the other's perspective. Husserl's concept of "transcendental intersubjectivity" refers to an objective world valid for everyone, which is constructed through empathy. The Other's body, along with the self's body, constitutes the shared objective world, as both are part of the natural world. Empathy, therefore, enables the intersubjective constitution of the objective world, allowing for a harmonious and synthetic unity among individuals.

Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida critically engage with Husserl's concept of empathy, expanding and challenging it in various ways.

Heidegger critiques Husserl's monadology, arguing that the world is not given to the isolated subject but is already structured by the presence of others. He emphasizes the primordiality of 'Being-with' and rejects empathy as a constitutive mode of Being-in-the-world.

Levinas further critiques Husserl's empathy by arguing that the Other is structurally outside every realm of expectation and intentionality. He posits that ethics is grounded in the face of the Other, which is an infinite and ungraspable alterity. This critique reverses Husserl's arrow of intentionality, prioritizing ethics over epistemology.

Derrida critiques Levinas's notion of the "wholly Other," arguing that it is not entirely other. He suggests that the Other requires a trace of the same for recognition, implying that empathy, in some form, is necessary. Derrida's critique highlights the impossibility of fully transcending the structures of language and thought.

These critiques have significant implications for ethics and transcendence. They emphasize the importance of recognizing the alterity of others, the limits of empathy, and the necessity of ethical engagement with the Other. They challenge traditional metaphysical and ontological frameworks, suggesting that ethics and transcendence are grounded in the encounter with the Other, rather than in the self or the world. This has profound implications for understanding the nature of ethics, the limits of human knowledge, and the possibility of genuine relationships.

In Levinas's philosophy, the "face of the other" is a central concept that signifies the profound alterity and transcendence of the other person. It represents the unattainable and infinite nature of the other, which cannot be fully understood or reduced to any cognitive or emotional schema. This face demands an infinite response of concern and respect, transcending the limits of empathy and knowledge.

The face of the other is crucial to empathy because it reveals the other as fundamentally different and beyond our comprehension. It is an encounter with the other's alterity that cannot be assimilated or objectified, thus challenging the ego's attempt to dominate or control. This encounter with the face is an experience of the other's transcendence, which Levinas argues is the foundation of ethics.

The experience of alterity through the face of the other leads to a transformation of the self. It compels the individual to respond ethically, recognizing the other's inherent dignity and the responsibility to care for them. This ethical response is not just a cognitive or emotional act but a fundamental transformation of the self, grounded in the recognition of the other's absolute otherness. In this way, the face of the other is integral to the concept of empathy, as it highlights the limits of human understanding and the necessity of ethical responsibility towards the other.

Derrida's concept of 'empathic antipathy' challenges traditional empathy by emphasizing a non-representational, asymmetrical relationship with the Other. It suggests that the Other is not fully graspable or reducible to the self, as traditional empathy often does. This antipathy implies a simultaneous attraction and repulsion, highlighting the impossibility of fully understanding or representing the Other. Derrida's analysis reveals the limits of language and representation in understanding the Other, as the concept of the 'wholly Other' is shown to be incoherent due to its inherent reliance on language and representation. This challenges the idea that empathy can fully bridge the gap between self and Other, suggesting that the experience of alterity is always partial and incomplete, and that the Other remains fundamentally beyond our grasp.