Full size book cover of Giving an Account of Oneself}

Giving an Account of Oneself

Judith Butler

4.18(1041 readers)
What does it mean to lead a moral life?

In her first extended study of moral philosophy, Judith Butler offers a provocative outline for a new ethical practice—one responsive to the need for critical autonomy and grounded in a new sense of the human subject.

Butler takes as her starting point one's ability to answer the questions "What have I done?" and "What ought I to do?" She shows that these question can be answered only by asking a prior question, "Who is this 'I' who is under an obligation to give an account of itself and to act in certain ways?" Because I find that I cannot give an account of myself without accounting for the social conditions under which I emerge, ethical reflection requires a turn to social theory.

In three powerfully crafted and lucidly written chapters, Butler demonstrates how difficult it is to give an account of oneself, and how this lack of self-transparency and narratibility is crucial to an ethical understanding of the human. In brilliant dialogue with Adorno, Levinas, Foucault, and other thinkers, she eloquently argues the limits, possibilities, and dangers of contemporary ethical thought.

Butler offers a critique of the moral self, arguing that the transparent, rational, and continuous ethical subject is an impossible construct that seeks to deny the specificity of what it is to be human. We can know ourselves only incompletely, and only in relation to a broader social world that has always preceded us and already shaped us in ways we cannot grasp. If inevitably we are partially opaque to ourselves, how can giving an account of ourselves define the ethical act? And doesn't an ethical system that holds us impossibly accountable for full self-knowledge and self-consistency inflict a kind of psychic violence, leading to a culture of self-beratement and cruelty? How does the turn to social theory offer us a chance to understand the specifically social character of our own unknowingness about ourselves?

In this invaluable book, by recasting ethics as a project in which being ethical means becoming critical of norms under which we are asked to act, but which we can never fully choose, Butler illuminates what it means for us as "fallible creatures" to create and share an ethics of vulnerability, humility, and ethical responsiveness.

Publisher

Fordham University Press

Publication Date

10/1/2005

ISBN

9780823225033

Pages

160

Categories

Social Sciences

About the Author

Portrait of author Judith Butler
Judith Butler
Judith Butler is an American post-structuralist and feminist philosopher who has contributed to the fields of feminism, queer theory, political philosophy and ethics. They are currently a professor in the Rhetoric and Comparative Literature departments at the University of California, Berkeley.

Butler received their Ph.D. in philosophy from Yale University in 1984, for a dissertation subsequently published as Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France. In the late-1980s they held several teaching and research appointments, and were involved in "post-structuralist" efforts within Western feminist theory to question the "presuppositional terms" of feminism.

Their research ranges from literary theory, modern philosophical fiction, feminist and sexuality studies, to 19th- and 20th-century European literature and philosophy, Kafka and loss, and mourning and war. Their most recent work focuses on Jewish philosophy and exploring pre- and post-Zionist criticisms of state violence.

Questions & Answers

Judith Butler critiques the traditional understanding of the "self" by emphasizing its social construction and its dependence on norms and discourses. She argues that the "self" is not an autonomous entity but is produced through interactions with others and through the norms that govern these interactions. This challenges the notion of a fixed, pre-existing self that has a direct relationship with morality and ethics.

Butler also highlights the role of language and narrative in shaping the self. She suggests that the self is constructed through storytelling and that the narratives we use to describe ourselves are not self-authored but are shaped by social and cultural contexts. This implies that the "self" is not a stable entity but is always in the process of being created and re-created.

Furthermore, Butler examines the relationship between the self and ethics, arguing that ethical responsibility is not solely a matter of individual choice but is deeply intertwined with the social and historical conditions that shape the self. This critique challenges traditional ethical theories that often assume a self-contained, autonomous individual as the basis for ethical reasoning and responsibility.

In Butler's account, the "other" plays a crucial role in ethical responsibility and recognition. It is the other who addresses us with questions like "Who are you?" and demands an account of ourselves. This address from the other creates the scene of recognition, which is a primary ethical relation. The norms and terms by which we give an account of ourselves are not of our own making but are social and established by the other. This means that our identity and the stories we tell are shaped by the other's expectations and norms, which can be limiting and restrictive.

Moreover, the other's recognition can alter us, introducing a sense of desire and trembling in desire, as Jean-Luc Nancy suggests. This recognition is not just a reflection of our own self-image but can also transform us, making us other than what we were. This process of recognition is not just about knowing ourselves but also about understanding our relationship to the other, which is essential for ethical responsibility. The other's presence and influence are thus integral to the construction of our identity and the ethical obligations we have.

Judith Butler argues that the act of giving an account of oneself is inherently flawed due to the limitations of self-knowledge and the social and historical contexts that shape our identities. She posits that our "singular" stories are told within a domain of unfreedom and substitutability, constrained by social norms and power structures. This opacity in self-knowledge means that we cannot fully narrate our lives or understand ourselves, and this has significant implications for ethical practice. It suggests that ethical "failure" may have value, as it acknowledges the limits of knowledge and encourages humility and generosity. Moreover, it implies that responsibility is not solely tied to self-knowledge or agency but is also grounded in our relationships with others and the social world, emphasizing the importance of ethical engagement with the unknown and the other.

Judith Butler's perspective on the relationship between power, knowledge, and the construction of the "self" is rooted in the idea that the self is not a fixed entity but is instead constructed through power dynamics and knowledge systems. She argues that power operates through various discourses and institutions, shaping how individuals understand themselves and their place in the world. Knowledge, in this context, is not objective but is produced and maintained by these power structures.

Butler posits that the "self" is not inherently given but is instead produced through a process of "subjectivation," where individuals are made subjects through language, norms, and social practices. This process is not deterministic but is characterized by the possibility of resistance and transformation. The construction of the "self" is thus always in flux, subject to the influence of power and knowledge.

In essence, Butler's view suggests that power and knowledge are essential in shaping the "self," and that understanding these dynamics is crucial for critically examining and potentially transforming the ways in which individuals are constructed and controlled by societal norms and institutions.

Judith Butler re-conceptualizes ethics by emphasizing the limitations of self-narration and the centrality of the "other." She argues that the self is not fully transparent or knowable, and thus, self-narration is inherently flawed. This opacity, she suggests, is not a deficit but rather a constitutive aspect of the self. Butler also highlights the importance of the "other" in ethical relations. The "other" is not just a source of judgment or recognition but also a fundamental aspect of our existence and ethical responsibility. This re-conceptualization challenges traditional ethical frameworks that rely on a fully transparent self and emphasizes the ethical dimension of acknowledging and responding to the "other," even in moments of unknowingness and failure. By doing so, Butler proposes an ethics that is more attuned to the complexities of human existence and the limitations of self-knowledge.

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