Oxford University Press
9/3/2024
9780197751404
376
The nature of free will is complex and debated. It generally refers to the capacity for individuals to make choices independently of external influences. This concept is often at odds with determinism, which posits that all events, including human actions, are determined by preceding events.
Free will and determinism are fundamentally incompatible. If determinism is true, free will is impossible because all actions would be predetermined. However, some argue that free will can exist within a deterministic framework, known as compatibilism. This view suggests that while actions are caused, individuals can still be morally responsible for their choices.
Causality plays a crucial role in this debate. If all events are caused, then free will seems threatened. Yet, some theories propose that free will can exist through non-causal or indeterministic processes, allowing for genuine choice and moral responsibility. The relationship between free will, determinism, and causality remains a central and unresolved issue in philosophy.
Reconciling free will with modern scientific understanding of the brain and human behavior involves acknowledging the complexity of human agency. Free will isn't just about the ability to choose between alternatives; it encompasses the capacity for self-forming choices or actions (SFAs), where agents can both perform actions and choose otherwise. This view suggests that while the brain's processes may be deterministic, the emergence of free will occurs at a higher level of explanation, where agents exercise teleological guidance control over their processes.
Quantum indeterminism in the brain might play a role in generating the indeterminacies necessary for SFAs. However, this doesn't reduce free will to mere chance or luck, as the agent's deliberative activity and intentions are crucial. The concept of complex dynamical systems, as seen in the human brain, can help explain how agents can have a causal role in their actions without reducing it to mental states alone. This approach allows for a coherent account of free will that is compatible with modern science, without needing to invoke supernatural or mystical elements.
The text discusses two dimensions of responsibility that are crucial for understanding moral and legal responsibility:
Responsibility for expressing the will: This dimension involves acting voluntarily and intentionally, without being constrained or forced. It is associated with the freedom of action, the ability to express the will one already has without external control.
Responsibility for having the will one expresses: This dimension concerns the formation and shaping of one's will. It is related to the freedom of will, the ability to form or shape the will one expresses in action and to act of "one's own free will." This dimension is deeply connected to the concept of ultimate responsibility, which involves being responsible for the kind of person one is and the will one has.
Both dimensions are necessary for a comprehensive understanding of moral responsibility. They are interrelated: the freedom of action is a prerequisite for the freedom of will, and the freedom of will is essential for the formation of the will that one expresses in action. This interconnectedness underscores the importance of both dimensions in discussions of free will and moral responsibility.
To make sense of free will without appealing to chance, luck, or mystery, we need to consider a nuanced understanding of determinism and indeterminism. First, we must distinguish between different types of freedom, will, and responsibility. Free will doesn't require actions to be completely undetermined; rather, it involves the ability to make choices that are not predetermined by past events or external forces.
Indeterminism, when properly understood, doesn't equate to randomness. It simply means that some events are not caused by preceding events in a deterministic manner. This indeterminism can be a part of the decision-making process, allowing for genuine choices without reducing them to mere chance.
Furthermore, the concept of "efforts of will" can play a crucial role. These efforts involve the agent's conscious and intentional actions, which contribute to the outcome without being solely determined by past events. This approach allows for a probabilistic causation, where the outcome is not certain but still caused by the agent's efforts.
By integrating these elements, we can reconcile free will with modern scientific understanding, providing a coherent and intelligible account that avoids reliance on chance, luck, or mystery.
The implications of free will for moral philosophy, ethics, and the human condition are profound. Free will is crucial for moral responsibility, as it allows individuals to be held accountable for their actions. It underpins the concept of desert, where individuals deserve rewards or punishment based on their choices. This belief in free will is essential for the functioning of legal and moral systems, as it justifies the idea that people can control their actions and thus deserve the consequences of their choices.
Ethically, free will is linked to dignity and respect. It suggests that individuals are not merely passive recipients of fate but active agents who can shape their own destinies. This understanding of human agency is vital for fostering a sense of self-worth and personal growth. However, the existence of free will also raises questions about determinism, moral responsibility, and the nature of causality, which can lead to debates about the limits of human freedom and the role of luck in our lives.
For the human condition, free will is integral to our understanding of ourselves as rational beings capable of making choices and pursuing goals. It is tied to our aspirations and the search for meaning, as it allows us to believe that our actions can have significant consequences and contribute to our personal development and the betterment of society. The debate over free will thus touches on the very essence of what it means to be human.